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Tech Security A brand-new strategy can find newer 4G ‘stingray’ cell phone sleuthing


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Tech Security A brand-new strategy can find newer 4G ‘stingray’ cell phone sleuthing

Security researchers say they have developed a new technique to detect modern cell-site simulators. Cell site simulators, known as “stingrays,” impersonate cell towers and can capture information about any phone in its range — including in some cases calls, messages and data. Police secretly deploy stingrays hundreds of times a year across the United States,…

Tech Security A brand-new strategy can find newer 4G ‘stingray’ cell phone sleuthing

Tech Security

Security scientists state they have developed a brand-new strategy to find modern cell-site simulators.

Cell website simulators, referred to as “stingrays,” impersonate cell towers and can catch info about any phone in its range– including in many cases calls, messages and information. Authorities privately release stingrays hundreds of times a year throughout the United States, typically capturing the information on innocent bystanders at the same time.

Little is learnt about stingrays, since they are deliberately shrouded in secrecy. Established by Harris Corp. and sold solely to authorities and police, stingrays are covered under stringent nondisclosure arrangements that prevent authorities from going over how the innovation works. However what we do know is that stingrays make use of defects in the method that mobile phone connect to 2G cell networks.

The majority of those flaws are repaired in the more recent, much faster and more secure 4G networks, though not all. Newer cell website simulators, called “Hailstorm” gadgets, take benefit of similar flaws in 4G that let police snoop on newer phones and devices.

Some phone apps claim they can discover stingrays and other cell website simulators, however a lot of produce wrong outcomes

Today researchers at the Electronic Frontier Structure have actually found a new method that can discover Hailstorm gadgets.

Enter the EFF’s latest job, called “Crocodile Hunter”— named after Australian nature conservationist Steve Irwin who was killed by a stingray’s barb in 2006– helps detect cell site simulators and deciphers neighboring 4G signals to determine if a cell tower is legitimate or not.

Each time your phone links to the 4G network, it runs through a list– called a handshake– to make certain that the phone is enabled to link to the network. It does this by exchanging a series of unencrypted messages with the cell tower, including unique information about the user’s phone– such as its IMSI number and its approximate location. These messages, understood as the master details block (MIB) and the system information block (SIB), are relayed by the cell tower to assist the phone connect to the network.

” This is where the heart of all of the vulnerabilities lie in 4G,” said Cooper Quintin, a senior staff technologist at the EFF, who headed the research.

Quintin and fellow researcher Yomna Nasser, who authored the EFF’s technical paper on how cell site simulators work, found that gathering and translating the MIB and SIB messages over the air can recognize potentially invalid cell towers.

This ended up being the structure of the Crocodile Hunter task.

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An unusual public picture of a stingray, produced by Harris Corp. Image Credits: U.S. Patent and Trademark Office

Crocodile Hunter is open-source, permitting anyone to run it, however it needs a stack of both software and hardware to work. Once up and running, Crocodile Hunter scans for 4G cellular signals, starts decoding the tower data, and utilizes trilateration to imagine the towers on a map.

However the system does need some thought and human input to discover anomalies that might identify a real cell website simulator. Those abnormalities can appear like cell towers appearing out of no place, towers that appear to move or do not match known mappings of existing towers, or are broadcasting MIB and SIB messages that don’t appear to make sense.

That’s why verification is necessary, Quintin stated, and stingray-detecting apps don’t do this.

” Even if we discover an anomaly, does not imply we found the cell site simulator. We in fact need to go confirm,” he stated.

In one test, Quintin traced a suspicious-looking cell tower to a truck outside a conference center in San Francisco. It turned out to be a legitimate mobile cell tower, contracted to broaden the cell capability for a tech conference inside. “Cells on wheels are pretty common,” said Quintin. “However they have some intriguing similarities to cell site simulators, specifically because they are a portable cell that isn’t typically there and suddenly it is, and then leaves.”

In another test performed previously this year at the ShmooCon security conference in Washington, D.C. where cell website simulators have actually been discovered prior to, Quintin discovered 2 suspicious cell towers using Crocodile Hunter: One tower that was transmitting a mobile network identifier connected with a Bermuda cell network and another tower that didn’t appear to be connected with a cell network at all. Neither made much sense, offered Washington, D.C. is nowhere near Bermuda.

Quintin stated that the task was targeted at helping to find cell website simulators, but conceded that authorities will continue to utilize cell site simulators for as long as the cell networks are susceptible to their use, an effort that could take years to fix.

Instead, Quintin said that the phone makers could do more at the gadget level to prevent attacks by allowing users to turn off access to legacy 2G networks, efficiently permitting users to opt-out of legacy stingray attacks. Meanwhile, cell networks and industry groups ought to work to repair the vulnerabilities that Hailstorm devices exploit.

” None of these solutions are going to be foolproof,” said Quintin. “But we’re not even doing the bare minimum yet.”


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